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Bankruptcy and Morality in a Capitalist Market Economy 
The Case of Mid-19th Century France 
Jürgen Finger, Paris 
 
In a draft for his ‘Théorie de l’unité universelle’ (1822/23), Charles Fourier (1772–1837) gave 
a colorful account of the reckless practices of commerce. He presented bankruptcy as the vice 
of merchants in what he called the ‘civilized’ era of human development: a free market 
economy. Insolvency was only a socially accepted façade for (fraudulent) bankruptcy.1 The 
1789 Revolution and its unsteady aftermath had shaped Fourier’s writings. Backed by 
suggestive anecdotes, resonating with both economic naiveté and anti-Semitic slurs he 
proposed an elaborate hierarchy of bankrupts.2 The “utopian” socialist, as he was belittled 
later on, postulated the depravity and insubstantiality of a modern market economy, which 
                                                 
1 C. Fourier (1845) ‘Section ébauchée des trois unités externes (19e section du plan général)’ La Phalange. 
Revue de la Science sociale, 1ère série in-8 vol. 14, no. 1, 3–42. A slightly truncated German translation of the 
draft was published by Friedrich Engels: F. Engels and C. Fourier (1970) ‘Ein Fragment Fouriers über den 
Handel’ in V. Adoratskij (ed.) Die Lage der arbeitenden Klasse in England und andere Schriften von August 
1844 bis Juni 1846, vol. I/4 of Marx/Engels Gesamtausgabe (Glashütten Ts.: Auvermann), pp. 409–53. Fourier 
inserted the section only as a stab in: C. Fourier (1841), Théorie de l’unité universelle, section 4 of Œuvres 
complètes, 2nd ed. (Paris: Société pour la propagation et la réalisation de la théorie de Fourier), vol. 3/4, pp. 
121–9. 
The project leading to this publication was supported by the P.R.I.M.E. program of the German Academic 
Exchange Service (DAAD), co-funded by the European Union’s Marie Skłodowska-Curie Actions (grant 
number 605728 under FP7-PEOPLE-2013-COFUND) and the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. 
2 See also C. Fourier (1841) Théorie des quatre mouvements et des destinées générales, section 1 of Œuvres 
complètes (Paris: Société pour la propagation et la réalisation de la théorie de Fourier), pp. 342–54. 
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lacked the social embeddedness of old-style retail and was precariously based on promissory 
notes and checkbook money. 
Fourier was aware of the various reasons, motivations and mechanisms of bankruptcy: 
incapacity vs. cool calculation, forward planning vs. improvised withdrawal, singular event 
vs. chain insolvencies. However, he identified bankruptcy as a social crime and theft.3 He 
even disparaged those insolvents with honorable intentions, eager to satisfy the claims of their 
creditors: They simply had not yet figured out that bankruptcy would be a regular way of 
enrichment in a market economy. Fourier’s stance certainly was inconsistent: He blamed both 
the character of the merchant and the economic system: ‘I have observed that bankruptcy is 
the only social crime that is epidemic, and that necessarily makes the reliable man [l’homme 
probre in the sense of the latin vir probatus] imitate the rogue.’4 Despite his cutting critique 
of the merchant class, he did not see the point in moralizing the individual merchant, as 
civilization itself had forced him into such behavior.5 He seems like a despaired moralist who 
bemoans the moral defects of market economy and is torn whether to blame the actors for it.  
Morality as a regulative idea guiding the actions of economic stakeholders would only be 
reinstated in a future state of civilization, in an upcoming era of ‘societary’ concurrence, 
characterized by the renewed social embeddedness of a morally bounded economy. This 
clearly referred to small scale communities like his Phalanstères, an early-socialist and 
experimental heterotopia (M. Foucault).6 Only then, the merchant class would submit to the 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 334.  
4 Fourier ‘Section ébauchée’ p. 42. All translations into English by the author. 
5 Fourier Théorie des quatre mouvements pp. 333–4. This corresponds to Fourier’s drive theory, which saw 
wealth as the first source and precondition of human happiness and, thus, as a legitimate goal of human 
existence. Cf. L. von Stein (1921) Die industrielle Gesellschaft. Der Sozialismus und Kommunismus in 
Frankreich von 1830 bis 1848, vol. 2 of: Geschichte der sozialen Bewegungen in Frankreich von 1789 bis auf 
unsere Tage (München: Drei-Masken-Vlg.) pp. 281–91. 
6 A. Kwaschik (2017) ‘Gesellschaftswissen als Zukunftshandeln. Soziale Epistemologie, genossenschaftliche 
Lebensformen und kommunale Praxis im frühen 19. Jahrhundert’ Francia, vol. 44, 189–211, esp. 209–11. 
Fourier’s idea of social and moral bounds, proper to both old-style retail and future ‘societary’ commerce, 
apparently is too narrow. He arbitrarily negates the possibility of moral and social relations in a market economy, 
as it has been analyzed in recent research by means of the term embeddedness: M. Granovetter (1985) 
‘Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness’ American Journal of Sociology, vol. 91, 
487–504; C. Dejung (2014), ‘Einbettung’ in C. Dejung, M. Dommann and D. Speich Chassé (eds) Auf der Suche 
nach der Ökonomie: Historische Annäherungen (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck) pp. 47–71; J. Beckert (2009) ‘The 
great transformation of embeddedness: Karl Polanyi and the New Economic Sociology’ in C. M. Hann and K. 
Hart (eds) Market and society: The great transformation today (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press) pp. 38–55. 
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interests of industrialists, farmers and land owners–as a writer of the 1820s he still omitted the 
working class–and would cease to be a ‘class of parasitic and unproductive agents’.7 
Fourier provides us with central arguments of the 19th century debate on bankruptcy: Firstly, 
Debt represents a social relation between debtor and creditor. Secondly, Fourier’s rejection of 
the modern market economy and his desire for small scale alternatives implies a critique of 
impersonal, abstract or dematerialized economic action and its supposed lack of individual 
responsibility. Supra-regional and international product chains seemed to loosen creditor-
debtor relations, as trade was less characterized by peer-to-peer commerce. Finally, debt and 
bankruptcy were always a question of morality. Not only the relations between individual 
stakeholders were moralized, also those with society and with an idealized merchant 
community. ‘Moralizing’ was meant to discourage stakeholders, debtors as well as creditors, 
from opportunistic behavior. The abstraction of the credit nexus, the problems of its 
moralization and of the instruments of moralization, and, what Fourier did not yet understand, 
the consequences of industrialization: these were the conflict zones in which the 19th century 
debate about bankruptcy evolved. 
The present article will use the case of bankruptcy (in the wide sense of the term, as used in 
American English) as an indicator for these structural and discursive challenges to traditional 
ways of moralizing the economy of debt in the Age of capital.8 Although bankruptcy was a 
rare and extreme situation in the life of an individual merchant, legislators and civil society of 
the 19th century always approached it as a question of principle, presumably affecting the 
functionality of trade and the national economy in general. How did moralizing discourses 
about bankruptcy evolve and how did they translate into the text and practice of commercial 
law? How did the discursive link between individual misconduct and common interest evolve, 
oscillating between public and private realm? What ensured the persuasiveness of moral 
arguments in public discourse, and why were the instruments of moralization questioned? 
This analysis of the ways of ‘moralizing’ does not mean to search for evidence for the alleged 
dismal moral condition of the political economy. Instead, morality and moralizing are 
understood as analytical tools to better understand the transition from the French merchant 
economy to an industrialized and capital-intensive economy. Moral and morality, the act of 
                                                 
7 Fourier, Théorie, pp. 331–4. 
8 E. J. Hobsbawm (1996) The Age of Capital 1848–1875 (New York: Vintage Books). 
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moralizing the behavior and character of others are based on customs and accepted standards 
of behavior (in the literal sense of the latin mos/mores). Such routines are moral by 
convention and by common practice, not by ethical deliberation and universal validity.9 
The French Revolution of 1848 serves as a test probe for this analysis. After a short 
contextualization of the economic problems in revolutionary and republican France (I), the 
juridical basics of French bankruptcy law are introduced (II). The paper then investigates 
debates on bankruptcy from 1848 to 1850/51, which reflected the changing moral evaluation 
of creditor-debtor relations. The article will show that the inability to settle a debt, once a 
question of common interest, became a predominately private problem. This changed the need 
for moralization, the instruments of moralization and the legitimacy of these instruments (III). 
Bills, parliamentary discussions and grey literature as well as petitions to the legislators and to 
the Prince-Président Louis Napoléon Bonaparte, the later Napoléon III, can elucidate the 
political, juridical and economic assessment of bankruptcy. Beyond that, these sources are 
indicators for moral evaluations by stakeholders of French mid-19th century commerce.10 
Belated Debates, Belated Reactions 
The 1840s saw a world ‘out of balance’, where huge economic, technical and social change 
did not go hand in hand with political and institutional consequences as the ‘economic 
cataclysm thus coincided with the visible corrosion of the old regimes’.11 A European 
economic crisis fed the already endemic political discontent and rising prices for grain and 
potatoes since 1846/47 finally triggered the February Revolution. The subsistence crisis 
necessitated food imports, thus capital drained out of France. The capital market, already 
burdened by the unprecedented capital demands of railway corporations, was hit by a severe 
credit crisis. Since 1848 the pendulum deflected in the opposite direction. Subsequent good 
harvests and the general depression made corn prices collapse even under than the pre-crisis 
                                                 
9 Lemma ‘Moral, moralisch, Moralphilosophie’(1984) in J. Ritter and K. Gründer (eds) Historisches Wörterbuch 
der Philosophie, vol. 6 (Basel: Schwabe), col. 149–168, esp. col. 149; K.-H. Ilting (1984) ‘Sitte, Sittlichkeit, 
Moral,’ in O. Brunner, W. Conze and R. Koselleck (eds) Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: Historisches Lexikon zur 
politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland, vol. 5 (Stuttgart: E. Klett; G. Cotta) pp. 863–921, esp. 863–4; M. 
Fourcade and K. Healy (2007) ‘Moral Views of Market Society’ Annual Review of Sociology, vol.  33, no. 1, 
14.1–14.27, doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.33.040406.131642. 
10 L. H. van Voss (2001) ‘Introduction: Petitions in Social History’ International Review of Social History, vol. 
46, no. 9, 1–10, doi:10.1017/S002085900100030x. 
11 E. J. Hobsbawm (1996) The Age of Revolution 1789–1848 (New York: Vintage Books), pp. 303, 307–8. 
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level, now generating major discontent in rural areas during the heyday of revolution.12 The 
economic shock of 1846–1851 had launched the Revolution and eventually contributed to the 
failure of the Second Republic. This was the starting signal for Napoléon III-style Saint-
Simonian industrialism including the promise of a new economic boom.13 
The number of faillites generally grew during the whole 19th century and stabilized only 
during the Belle Époque, when France experienced a boom for almost two decades. This 
increase corresponded to the general multiplication of businesses during the century. Political 
and economic development did correlate, but in an irregular and indirect way.14 Spikes of the 
bankruptcy statistics preceded or succeeded the revolutionary moments of 1830 and 1848 as 
well as the Franco-German war and the Commune uprising in 1870/71. In a context of 
growing supranational trade and investment, the London 1847 panic, the 1869 Black Friday 
and finally the Paris stock market crash in 1882 also had considerable influence. The news 
reporting of the time reflected the awareness of such interdependency: The Moniteur 
universel, for example, related a growing number of bankruptcies of British industrial 
companies and merchant banks engaged in overseas trade in 1847.15 In the context of general 
crisis, even a report by the Times seemed noteworthy that there had not been any new 
bankruptcy at all on a given day.16 
The number of bankruptcies regularly and significantly dropped after such moments of 
political and economic turbulence. The previous wave of bankruptcies had amounted to a 
market adjustment, so that the remaining businesses were deemed more stable. French 
governments also favored the viability of these surviving businesses by extending the terms of 
payment and by decreeing temporary rules for bankruptcy procedures for the violent 
transition phases of 1848, 1870, and again in 1919–22.17 This schedule also applies to the 
                                                 
12 M. Agulhon (1993) The Republican Experiment 1848–1852 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press) pp. 7–8, 35–
6, 82–5; W. Fortescue (2005) France and 1848: The End of Monarchy (London, New York: Routledge), pp. 43–
45; J. Sperber (1994) The European Revolutions 1848–1851 (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press), pp. 24–6, 
105–7. 
13 Agulhon, Republican Experiment, pp. 35–45, 82–85, 178–83. 
14 For the following: L. Marco (1989) La montée des faillites en France, XIXe–XXe siècles (Paris: l’Harmattan), 
pp. 5–8, partially own calculations based on data pp. 165, 173. 
15 Le Moniteur universel 1847, 670, 2111, 2648, 2651, 2672, 2700, 2704, 2708, 2714, 2724, 2738, 2798, 2802. 
16 Le Moniteur universel 1847, 2724 (21 October 1847). 
17 J.-M. Thiveaud (1993) ‘Lʼordre primordial de la dette: Petite histoire panoramique de la faillite, des origines à 
nos jours’ Revue d'économie financière, vol. 25, no. 2, 67–106, doi:10.3406/ecofi.1993.1989, esp. 89, 95; L. 
Thomas (1880) Études sur la faillite: De la faillite dans le droit français et dans le droit étranger. Observations 
sur quelques points spéciaux de la législation française en matière de faillite (Paris: Larose), pp. 16–7. 
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1848 revolution: After having reached an all-time high in 1847, the number of bankruptcies 
significantly decreased during the Republican years. Surprisingly, the monetary volume of the 
1848/49 settlements was unusually high. With a ratio of assets and liabilities of 59 per cent in 
1848 and 46 per cent in 1849, instead of usually about 25 to 35 per cent, procedures 
apparently had struck merchants who still disposed of considerable assets and who were all 
but overindebted.18 The controversy about bankruptcy in the aftermath of the 1848 revolution 
came too late for most of the affected businesses. Yet, the discussion about inefficient 
procedures, deserving and undeserving bankrupts clearly addressed a relevant problem of the 
time. 
Flaws of the 1807 Napoleonic Bankruptcy Law 
Already during the first French Revolution, economic troubles, scandals and the collapse of 
merchants proved the severe disorder of economy and society. Napoléon introduced a vast 
program of legal codifications to harmonize and modernize French law. Public order should 
be re-established, and morality be reintroduced into the economy. The Code de commerce of 
1807 offered a comprehensive regulation of commercial activity by replacing the 1673 
Ordonnance sur le commerce. Frequent cases of bankruptcy incited Napoléon to tighten the 
measures against bankrupts.19 
The legitimacy of French bankruptcy law depended on the idea to combine private interest on 
the one hand, represented in the claims of the creditor against his debtor, and public welfare 
on the other hand. A government circular letter issued during the elaboration of the Code de 
commerce proves how individualizing moralization and reference to the common good went 
hand in hand, and how this union was usually emphasized with strong rhetoric: 
In general, it is impossible to end the malpractices to which insolvencies give an 
opportunity without severe laws: but, as you know, there is no trade without credit, no 
credit without guaranties. Severe laws against bad faith are protecting probity and, by 
clearing the theater of business usurped by adventurers, they shall tend to bring back 
the morality that honors trade, consolidates it and assures public trust into it. 
                                                 
18 Marco, Montée, p. 165. 
19 Thiveaud, ‘Ordre’, 84–7. This is not the place to retrace the revisions of the Code de commerce, or to describe 
the institutional development of commercial courts: C. Saint-Alary-Houin (ed.) (2009) Qu’en est-il du Code de 
commerce 200 ans après: État des lieux et projections (Toulouse: Presses de l’Univ. des sciences sociales de 
Toulouse); C. Delplanque (ed.) (2008) Bicentenaire du Code de commerce, 1807–2007 (Paris: Dalloz).  
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The argumentation was representative for the decades to come. It integrated the (personal) 
credit of the merchant, trust in an abstract commerce (thus favoring public credit and state 
financing) and, finally, public order and morality. As we will show, the specific mixture of the 
individual and collective level became problematic during the 19th century, in an era of 
growing individualism. Curiously, the moral rigor of the distinctly modern Napoleonic 
codifications was in stark contrast to the relative remissness of early modern merchant 
practices. The latter often were embedded in kin and peer networks allowing for amicable 
arrangements in case of over-indebtedness. As Natacha Coquery stated, the early modern 
‘commercialist’ concept of bankruptcy was less rigorist and more pragmatic, more about 
stabilizing the relation instead of ending it and squeezing out the money by means of the 
law.20 
French 19th century legislation distinguished the imbalance of assets and liabilities in a 
balance sheet, which caused a cessation of payments and insolvency (faillite), and cases of 
bankruptcy, which implicate criminal prosecution (banqueroute). The first had to be declared 
at the Tribunal de commerce, the commercial court, by submitting a balance of accounts 
(dépôt de bilan). The latter was punishable and covered acts of deceiving the creditors, be it 
by negligence, gambling, and excessive borrowing (banqueroute simple) or by fraud and in 
bad faith (banqueroute frauduleuse).21 These dispositions as well as the Code de commerce in 
general only applied to merchants (commerçants). For all others, the state of déconfiture was 
defined by the Code civil.22 Both forms of bankruptcy (in the narrow sense) regularly induced 
criminal charges as the debtor was suspected to harm the interests of all or of part of the 
creditors by abstracting assets or by conspiring with selected creditors. ‘Simple’ bankrupts 
                                                 
20 L. Fontaine (2008) L'Économie morale. Pauvreté, crédit et confiance dans l'Europe préindustrielle (Paris: 
Gallimard), pp. 281–296, esp. 288–98, 302–3; N. Coquery (2013) ‘Credit, trust and risk. Shopkeepers' 
bankruptcies in 18th-century Paris‘ in T. M. Safley (ed.) The History of Bankruptcy. Economic, social and 
cultural implications in early modern Europe (London: Routledge), pp. 52–71, esp. 51-54, 61–66. 
21 For the following: Code de commerce ([Paris]: [1807]), 3rd book, titles 1 (especially 1st chapter) and 4, art. 
437–48, 586–603. The general elements did not change much in the first half of the century, as a concise 
overview of the procedure in a report to the National Assembly shows: Le Moniteur universel 1850, 2244–5 
(Report by Bravard-Veyrières). V. Dalloz (1830), Jurisprudence des faillites, de la banqueroute, de la 
déconfiture, ou collection complète des arrêts rendus par les Cours de France et des Pays-Bas sur cette matière: 
Précédée de l’exposé des principes de la législation et de la doctrine des auteurs sur ces diverses matières 
(Brüssel: H. Tarlier). 
22 The definition of a ‘merchant’ was tautologic, like in most commercial legislation: ‘Sont commerçants ceux 
qui exercent des actes de commerce [sic!], et en font leur profession habituelle’ (C. com., 1st book, art. 1). The 
state of déconfiture was not treated by civil law as systematically as faillite and banqueroute were in commercial 
law. Neither the Code Civil nor the Code de procédure civile had a special section. Its effects were mentioned 
i.a. in: (An XII=1804) Code civile des Français […] suivi des lois transitoires sur l’adoption, le divorce et les 
enfants naturels, 2 vols (Paris: Journal du Palais), art. 1267, 1613, 1913, 2003, 2032. 
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faced imprisonment up to two years. Fraudulent bankrupts and their accomplices were to be 
punished by heavy labor in a bagne, a jail in seaports reminiscent of the former punishment 
on the galères. Only Napoléon III had replaced these with penitentiary camps in the colonies, 
now also called bagne. 
As a preventive against fraudsters, the commercial court, after verification of the balance 
sheets, established the date of imbalance–referring to the immaterial fact that from a certain 
point there were more passifs than actifs in the accountancy books. This point in time not 
necessarily corresponded with the date of dépôt de bilan. Intermittent, potentially abusive 
transactions had to be reversed. Merchants who tried to save their company by avoiding a 
cessation of payments, bargaining, pleading for delay and restructuring debt ran into danger of 
filing insolvency too late. The merchant then could be accused of having dissimulated the 
imbalance and deceived new business partners.23 
Each insolvent was threatened to be immediately imprisoned in a maison d’arrêt pour dettes, 
a debtors’ prison, irrespective of the nature of the insolvency. Under the regulations of the 
commercial code, the court arrested the debtor, blocked his belongings by affixing seals 
(scellés), and nominated a syndic for the administration of the property as well as a juge 
commissaire (bankruptcy judge) for controlling the syndic.24 In the meantime, the debtor’s 
property rights were substantially undermined; his rights of disposal were transferred to the 
delegates of the court. A complete standstill of the business usually was the result. If there had 
not been a major imbalance in the first place, it would arise now. 
However, the declaration of insolvency also protected the merchant, as an individual request 
for contrainte par corps (coercive arrest) could not be filed against a declared insolvent. The 
common interest of the creditors as a collectivity had priority. Curiously, demanding a 
contrainte par corps against a merchant could trigger an insolvency, which then helped the 
debtor to avoid coercive arrest. This, however, was only a Phyrrus victory, as the 
imprisonment by order of the commercial judge was imminent.25 
The contrainte par corps, not be confounded with the automatic arrest of the insolvent, 
literally meant to get hold of the debtor’s body in order to urge him to pay. It was the thematic 
                                                 
23 Thomas, Études, pp. 23–4. 
24 Dalloz, Jurisprudence, pp. 86–99; Thiveaud, ‘Ordre’, 86–7; C. com., art. 455, 568. 
25 R. T. Troplong (1847), De la contrainte par corps en matière civile et de commerce: Commentaire du titre 
XVI, livre III, du Code civil (Paris: C. Hingray), pp. 275–84, 297–300. 
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anchor par excellence for a moral and functional evaluation of bankruptcy law, even though 
the contrainte seemed to have concerned merchants only seldom. It seemed to have provided 
a false focal point for the discussion, as the idea to promote trade and crédit publique by 
arresting defaulting merchants did not correspond to the reality of business life.26 For many 
creditors instead, automatic arrest and contrainte represented the ultimate guarantee of 
outstanding debts, a last resort. The debtor, in contrast, faced the debtors’ prison as a 
temporary, however limited, form of civil death. 
A 1838 revision of the so-called Code des faillites, the third book of the commercial code, 
took into account the insufficient results of the highly moralistic and complex dispositions of 
1807. The goal was to accelerate and simplify procedures, to facilitate settlements and to 
clarify the rehabilitation procedure for those creditors who were cleared from the suspicion of 
fraudulent misconduct and had fulfilled all claims, even those claims waived by the creditors 
in an earlier settlement.27 Even after a successful settlement, the status of failli did not change. 
Only the formal rehabilitation allowed a fresh start for the debtor, as he was reinstated into his 
full political rights like officiating as a juryman or an officer of the National Guard, 
membership in the chamber of commerce, and, not least, access to the stock exchange. Only 
the rehabilitation procedure ended the symbolic and social exclusion of the defaulting 
debtor.28 From the moralizing perspective formal rehabilitation was ambiguous: In the first 
place, moralization was bounded to an act of misconduct. When all liabilities were fulfilled, 
the reparation of this act was acknowledged and the need for moralization suspended. This 
relativized the significance of morality as a character feature. 
Both institutions, contrainte par corps and formal rehabilitation, represented asynchronies in 
19th century law. These relics of the early modern regime of commercial morality, 
paradoxically reinforced by the Napoleonic modernization of the commercial code, 
assimilated each cessation of payments to a crime against society and public weal. The 
contrainte violated the personal freedom of the debtor for the sake of enforcing private 
claims. A creditor could detain his debtor in a public prison–without any criminal charge, 
without the approval of a criminal judge, for a relatively long period, and at his own expense. 
                                                 
26 P.-C. Hautcœur (2008) ‘La statistique et la lutte contre la contrainte par corps: L’apport de Jean-Baptiste 
Bayle-Mouillard’ Histoire et mesure, vol. 23, no. 1, 167–89, http://journals.openedition.org/histoiremesure/3093, 
date accessed 1 February 2018, esp. par. 28–30. 
27 Thiveaud, ‘Ordre’, 87–9. 
28 C. com., art. 604–14. 
10 
 
In the age of codifications and of normative individualism, the contrainte par corps 
represented an undue mixing of private law, public law and the penal system. The contrainte 
became a systematic problem.29 The traditional idea to moralize the debtor by getting hold of 
him and punishing him, faced a substantial backlash by the ethical reasoning of modern 
individualism and liberal ideas of the rule of law. 
French legislators were aware of this confusion of realms. The contrainte was subject to the 
back and forth of French political history: Abolished for the first time by the Convention on 9 
March 1793, it was reintroduced by the same Convention on 14 March 1795 (loi du 24 
ventôse, an V). The Directory regime proceeded to refine the rules of its application (loi du 15 
germinal, an VI=4 April 1798). Napoléon integrated the contrainte into his codifications of 
civil law, civil procedure, and commercial law without discarding the prior laws. Reformed 
and modernized in 1832, during the July Monarchy, the provisional government of 1848 
abolished the contrainte. The Assemblée reintroduced it again on September 1 of the same 
year. Only in 1867, the contrainte was finally abolished in matters of private and commercial 
law. From then, coercive arrest could only be applied in matters of public interest (penal law, 
enforcement of fees and taxes etc.).30 
High Expectations and Legislative Detail Work 
The February Revolution provided an occasion to reflect on the nature both of bankruptcy and 
the bankrupt person. Although a general reform never seemed to be on the agenda, the 
journées révolutionaires and the following two years seemed propitious for reforming the so-
called Code des faillites. The success of these attempts to reform was limited: brought 
forward at the zenith of the Second Republic, and discussed at length, the time window for 
reform quickly closed. 
Four contentious issues can be identified: the ranking of workers’ wages in the bankruptcy 
procedure; short-term relief for merchants whose businesses were affected by revolutionary 
turmoil; the reform of settlement procedures and assignment agreements; finally, one bill 
addressed misconduct in insolvency procedures. 
                                                 
29 H. É. Say (1837), Avant-propos à la discussion d’une nouvelle loi sur les faillites (Paris: Guillaumin et Cie.), 
pp. 1–7, 52–7; J. Sgard (2013) ‘Bankruptcy, fresh start and debt renegotiation in England and France (17th to 
18th century)‘ in Safley (ed.) The History of Bankruptcy, pp. 223-35 esp. 223–4. 
30 Hautcœur, ‘Statistique’, par. 28–30; Troplong, Contrainte, p. 508. 
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(1) During the initial phase of the Republic, working class representatives introduced a bill to 
rank workers’ wages (up to three months) among the privileged liabilities. Louis Marius 
Astouin (1822–55), a representative of the Bouches-du-Rhône, was a syndic of the influential 
load-carriers’ corporation of Marseille harbor. In June 1848, the moderate democrat, who 
regularly sat in the Assemblée in worker’s cloths, introduced the bill ‘in the name of my 
brothers, the workers’. Astouin evoked the traditional differentiation of incomes from 
productive (‘real’) work and from capitalist speculation–a differentiation as popular in 
Christian theology as in early socialism. If workers did not participate in the employer’s 
profits, why should they participate in a loss in the case of insolvency? Astouin also assumed 
that insolvency might have become a business model for merchants: Speaking of ‘malheur’ 
would have been mere facade for failed speculation at the expense of the workers.31 
Astouin’s bill met considerable opposition. Doubts were raised, if the proposition really 
would strengthen the position of workers, as employers might exercise ‘moral’ pressure on 
the workers to renounce wage payment during an economic downturn. Workers would have 
to rely on the legally protected but uncertain claim to a future insolvency estate. Moreover, 
such a privilege would produce high uncertainty for investors. Eventual arrears of wages from 
three months would result in considerable liabilities. The liberal position was clear: In the 
ongoing crisis, workers needed work; there was no work without credit; and the Astouin bill 
would restrict credit and hinder capital circulation.32 To the liberals, now and then, being 
social (and moral) meant creating jobs. 
Liberals also pointed out that workers (usually paid on a daily or weekly basis) who did not 
claim their wages simply became creditors of their employer. Advocates of the bill 
acknowledged this, but they put it into perspective and interpreted debt as a social relation: 
During an economic crisis–sort of a sellers’ market for abundant human workforce–the self-
interest of workers would guide them to continue working, as they would neither want to lose 
their workplace nor the money already owed by the employer: ‘he [the worker] is chained to 
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his master precisely because of the debt constituted by his salary, which has not been paid to 
him.’33 
After the violent Journées de Juin (22–26 Jue 1848) and the anti-socialist backlash of the 
bourgeois Republic, the time window for such legislation was closed. The bill disappeared 
from the agenda without further notice. Nonetheless, the threat of insolvencies by large 
(industrial) companies added new, large-scale problems to the question of financially and 
morally bankrupt merchants. In 1848, the actors only started to understand the scope of these 
problems in future industrial capitalism. Only in 1889, wages were added to the list of 
privileged claims.34 
(2) The second political intervention had a limited goal and better corresponded to the taste of 
the Assemblée’s majority: protecting businesses at the verge of bankruptcy.35 The provisional 
government already had issued a decree on 20 March 1848, allowing the commercial courts to 
grant a general extension of the terms of credit up to three months.36 After the Journées de 
Juin, a debate about further emergency measures began. The original idea to reform the 
procedures for concordats amiables, for amicable settlements, met considerable resistance. 
Finally, not less than seven different propositions with a substantial number of amendments 
were debated. According to unconfirmed numbers, often cited during the debate, about 6500 
to 7000 cessations of payment were registered in Paris since 20 February 1848. However, it 
was contested, how many of them went back to the prerevolutionary crisis. The data given 
above suggests that insolvencies rather emanated from a structural crisis in 1846/47 than from 
the political events of 1848. Nonetheless: ‘Capital was frightened, it hid,’ as one 
representative stated. All his colleagues shared the analysis, but they did not agree on the 
ways, how credit and stability could be restored: by emergency measures of all kind or by 
relying on the existing system of guaranties in the commercial code.37  
Even socialists like Victor Considérant (1808–93) adhered to the idea to promote commerce 
by granting debtors more room to manoeuver. The social philosopher and promoter of 
Fourier’s Phalanstère movement pleaded to empower the debtors against their creditors to 
                                                 
33 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 1722–3 (Laboulie, Rouher). 
34 Thiveaud, ‘Ordre’, 93. 
35 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 1307 (8 June 1848), 1440 (20 June 1848), 1987 (report by Bravard-Bayrières). 
36 ‘Projet de moratoire des effets de commerce. Sursis aux déclarations de faillite’, Archives Nationales (AN), 
AN/F/12/6835/B, Dossier 1848. 
37 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 1985–9, 2046–52, 2061–5, 2077–82, 2105–11, the citation p. 1986. 
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grant tranquility and equity in French commerce.38 In contrast, the conservative Pierre de 
Sainte-Beuve (1819–55), who already had supported the reintroduction of the contrainte, 
mocked his colleagues and suggested to insert an article into the original bill, stipulating that 
all ‘debtors are exempted from the duty to repay their debt.’39 This sarcastic remark was 
representative for the general mood of the liberal and conservative majority and corresponded 
with the position of the Cavaignac government. During the third reading, Finance minister 
Michel Goudchaux (1797–1862) finally rejected the idea to facilitate concordats amiables, 
observing that the Republic should not be built on exceptional laws.40 
After extensive debate, only a decree with limited scope was adopted on 22 August 1848, As 
a pure transitionary measure all cessations of payment since the end of the July Monarchy on 
24 February 1848 until the date of publication of the decree should provisionally not be 
considered faillite. The decree temporarily reversed the norm (every cessation is faillite). The 
commercial courts were authorized to omit from the arrest of the debtor, from the concomitant 
suspension of business and the affixing of the seals; debtors should be enabled to liquidate 
businesses themselves.41 
French merchants were divided. One group pleaded for a utilitarian approach and was 
favorable to government intervention to avoid the collapse of businesses, unemployment and 
thus a danger for stability and public order. Not the fight against the rare cases of incapability 
and fraudulent behavior should define the primary target of the law, but protecting all 
merchants. For them, the revolution was an unforeseeable case of force majeure.42 This 
utilitarian view could invoke modernizing arguments brought forward by liberal economists 
and statisticians like Jean-Baptiste Bayle-Mouillard and Horace E. Say, a liberal economist in 
the tradition of his father, Jean-Baptiste Say.43 
A second group of merchants feared to lose the guarantees for their outstanding accounts. 
Instead of helping an allegedly small minority of commerçants malheureux, the decree would 
clear the way for unsound and fraudulent racketeers. This group was aware of the fact, that 
                                                 
38 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 2062–3. 
39 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 2080; Robert and Cougny, Dictionnaire, vol. 5, p. 249. 
40 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 2106.  
41 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 2155 (Décret relatif aux concordats amiables du 22 août 1848). 
42 ‘Notes of the Délégués du Commerce de Paris “Des vraies raisons de décider dans la question dite des 
Concordats Amiables”’, AN/F/12/6835/A; ‘Merchants of the City of Blanc (Indre) to the Citoyens membres du 
Gouvernement Provisoire’ (30 March 1848), AN/F/12/6835/B.  
43 Hautcœur, ‘Statistique,’ par. 15–7 ; Say, Avant-propos. 
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the utilitarian and the moral approach were partially incompatible: If the decision on the 
cessation of payment and the exact time of its declaration ceased to be a moral question, 
reinforced by the ‘salutary fear’ of incarceration, insolvency would become an object of 
speculation. In other words: it would become a business option for debtors.44 
But both groups shared common reference points: They desired to re-establish trust within 
French commerce and to further the crédit public. And, although they drew different 
conclusions, both based their moral argument on the idea of commercial utility. The liberals, 
who partially had approved the emergency measures, later were reticent. The effects of the 
decree seemed to confirm the doubts of the conservatives. In hindsight, Pierre Bravard-
Veyrières (1804–61), representative of the Puy-de-Dôme, professor at the Sorbonne law 
faculty and author of a manual on commercial law, gave a disillusioned report on the abuses 
of the law. For him, one could not speak of force majeure, if most merchants passed through 
the crisis ‘without bowing’. The legislation committee had been ‘touched by the misfortune of 
a certain number of notable merchants, and moved by a sentiment of merciful equity.’ 
Bravard-Veyrières sarcastically emotionalized the motives of his colleagues and countered 
them with reserved economic arguments. The law professor believed that the decree, amended 
in a rush, was inconsistent and an example of poor legislation. Yet, he was confident that the 
courts were able to distinguish deserving and undeserving insolvents.45 Even a utilitarian 
liberal like Bravard-Veyrières thus had a specific idea of worthiness, a defaulting debtor had 
to prove. 
Cases of allegedly ruthless merchants, who invoked the decree even after its formal period of 
validity, motivated Bravard-Veyrières to request a clarifying resolution. The decree seemed to 
have offered the possibility of judicial liquidation to those who allegedly had not merited it. 
The competent committee of the Assemblée, too, questioned the benefit of the measure ‘made 
for an exceptional and temporary situation’. It may have been ‘profitable’ for individual 
                                                 
44 ‘Observations présentées à l’Assemblée Nationale par le Comptoir National d’Escompte de Paris sur les 
projets de Décrets relatifs aux concordats amiables’; ‘Avis de M. Gautier, sous-gouverneur de la Banque [de 
France]’ (2 July 1848); ‘Lyon Chamber of commerce to the Minister for Agriculture and Commerce’ (10 June 
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45 Le Moniteur universel 1848, 2583–4 (‘Observations sur l’application du décret du 22 août 1848, relatif aux 
concordats amiables, par M. Bravard-Veyrières’); Robert and Cougny, Dictionnaire, vol. 1, pp. 473–4.  
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commerçants, but not necessarily for the entire French commerce. Without further discussion, 
the Assemblée approved the resolution in autumn 1849.46 
(3) The third topic concerned the simplification of the concordats par abandon, a special form 
of settlement, where the debtor assigned all or part of his property to the creditors, who then 
were responsible for the exploitation on their own–and at their own risk. This practice existed 
in a legal vacuum, but an increasing number of assignments was accepted by commercial 
courts–setting aside risks for creditors and overt procedural deficits. Bravard-Veyrières 
brought forward a bill to ensure the early information of all creditors about the settlements’ 
details. The court’s approval of such concordats should be published for the attention of those 
creditors, who had not participated or had not accepted the settlement.47 The bill generally 
was welcomed, but finally, during the third reading, the topic first was delayed and then was 
took off the agenda. Eugène-Émile Loyer (1807–80), an entrepreneur from Rouen, did not see 
any need for reform at all, and seems to have blocked the bill by procedural ruse.48 
(4) A last bill by representatives Pierre Henri Sevaistre (1801–51) and Joseph de Laboulie 
(1800–67), did not address a systematic problem, but focused on specific forms of misconduct 
in bankruptcy procedures. The representatives pointed out institutional deficits at the 
commercial courts and unlawful acts of the syndics. This bill already stranded during the 
preliminary discussion in the assembly.49 Laboulie’s charges were serious: ‘You have created 
a new class, a new industry at the commercial courts, called the bankruptcy syndicate’. The 
only interest of this syndicat des faillites would be to never finish any procedure.50 The overt 
attack on commercial courts and syndics may have been a reason why this bill failed. 
Numerous representatives participated in these debates, but some stood out. Compared to 
their overall political view, their opinion on bankruptcy was not self-evident. Astouin and his 
friends solely spoke for the interests of the workers and were barely interested in technical 
questions of commercial law. Bravard-Veyrières was described as politically conservative, 
                                                 
46 Le Moniteur universel 1849, 3424 (committee report on the bill of Bravard-Veyrières), 3463–4, 3521, 3606 
(second committee report), 3643 (adoption without discussion); Le Moniteur universel 1850, 438 (excerpts from 
a booklet by Bravard-Veyrières). 
47 Le Moniteur universel 1850, 894–5 (committee report by Laboulie on the Bravard-Veyrières bill), 2244–5 
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sitting on the right side of the house, but liberal in legal matters. His moderately modernizing 
reports and bills indicate to his distinctly modern grasp of the problem. In contrast, the 
conservative Laboulie and the small-town entrepreneur Sevaistre focused on institutionalized 
misconduct and displayed a moralizing and individualizing stance. Their bill against the 
syndics was the fruit of a non-partisan alliance: Sevaistre was the owner of a small spinning 
factory from Elbeuf (Seine-Ínférieure). Former president of the local commercial court, he 
was thought to be an independent seated at the left of the assembly. The former Bourbonic 
legitimist Laboulie was an independent right-wing representative of the Bouches-du-Rhône. 
They all retreated from politics after Napoléon’s coup, unlike Eugène-Émile Loyer who had 
fervently opposed the last two bills. Loyer, a former lawyer, represented the Seine-Inférieure 
and was director of a spinning factory, just like Sevaistre. But unlike Sevaistre, Loyer was a 
future Bonapartist magnate in the important port city of Rouen.51 
Overall, the debates mostly were characterized by legal reflections, but always underpinned 
with anecdotic evidence and hypothetical cases. Particularly scandalous examples and 
allegedly all too common behavior were brought forward to illustrate grievances and abuse of 
the law. It was the same anecdotic modus that promoted the moralization of bankruptcy and 
the individualization of its reasons in books of fiction by realist and naturalist authors like 
Honoré de Balzac and Emile Zola. They used the doom of bankruptcy as a springboard to 
explore the decadence and decay of the French bourgeoisie and, in general, the shallowness of 
their time.52 
Empirical knowledge in form of statistical information, was introduced only on rare 
occasions. Sevaistre communicated self-made statistical information about the outcome of 
procedures at an unnamed commercial court–most probably in Elbeuf, where he had been 
president. Bravard-Veyrières evaluated the effects of the 1848 decree within the circuit of the 
Tribunal de commerce of the Seine Department.53 Statistical data on the contrainte par corps 
and its effects never seemed to have influenced the political and juridical discussion. Jean 
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Baptiste Bayle-Mouillard’s study De l’emprisonnement pour dettes, awarded a prize by the 
Academie des sciences morales et politiques in 1835, had only little effect.54 
Openly moralizing, sometimes emotional rhetoric contrasted sharply with a measured and 
primarily technical style of argumentation. Sevaistre explicitly evoked the need for 
‘moralization of commerce’ and the ‘just and moralizing mindset’ of Napoleonic bankruptcy 
law. His rhetoric was full of judgmental expressions: abuse, equity, extreme, fraud, good/bad 
faith, grave, honorable, illegitimate, incapable, justice, malheur, merit, scandalous. Quite 
contrary to the liberal jurist Bravard-Veyrières, who hardly ever evoked the ‘malheur’ of an 
otherwise honest merchant.55 This often-cited ‘misfortune’ was a deeply moralistic term, in a 
certain sense even a romantic concept, which can best be illustrated with reference to the ship 
owner Pierre Morrell in Alexandre Dumas’ ‘Comte de Monte-Christo’ (1844–46). The idea of 
malheur had also influenced French jurisprudence; sentences acknowledged the existence of 
bankrupts who were ‘unfortunate but with good faith’, victims of the ‘too hazardous chances 
of commerce’, struck by ‘inevitable misfortune’.56 Even creditors got moralized, when a 
settlement was not approved and when opaque tactics of some of them aimed at the arrest of 
the debtor–risking the dividend of the other creditors. The personal enemy, who tried to press 
home an advantage, and the malicious asset stripper, who extorted a preferential treatment, 
were frequent topoi of the debate.57 
To a certain extent, all discussants still clung to the ‘fantasy, if not always the reality, of 
personal, individual responsibility’, as Rebecca Spang put it with reference to the 18th 
century.58 This individualizing tone was compatible with classic economist’s views (J.-B. 
Say, A. Smith). Apart from an early contribution by Jean de Sismondi, a new economic 
contextualization of bankruptcy emerged only in the second half of the 19th century. 
Economists like Karl Marx, Rudolf Hilferding, Werner Sombart, and Joseph Schumpeter 
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began to understand bankruptcy as an adaptation crisis on the individual level, a purgatory in 
which small, undercapitalized and dispensable market actors were liquidated.59 
Industrial growth irrevocably changed the game: Kinship networks of mutual assistance once 
had provided credit and were a last resort for merchants in trouble; additionally, they were 
effective barriers against opportunistic behavior by both debtors and creditors. Such networks 
began to lose their relevance as was already tangible in the 1848 debates. During the 
following decades it became evident: Industrialization and external financing for companies 
had a disruptive effect–especially after the liberalization of the Sociétés anonymes in 1863/67. 
The organizational structure of the companies changed, the sole proprietorship eroded and–in 
the medium-term–the entrepreneurial role was separated from ownership during the so-called 
managerial revolution. Organizing (joint) responsibility–including shared control, knowledge 
and motivation–became a problem, discussed until today under the keywords principal-agent 
problem and compliance. Finally, the integration of companies into the capital market 
increased the vulnerability of firms during economic crises of a new type in the second half of 
the 19th century.60 
In 1848, the understanding of these changes obviously was limited. Even for liberal 
modernizers insolvency still was understood as a problem between businessmen; the merchant 
with unlimited liability continued to be the addressee of commercial law. The points of 
reference (economy, society, crédit public) remained abstract. Only seldom, like in the 
Astouin bill on workers’ wages, the focus was shifted to the growing relevance of industrial 
labor. 
Traditionally, the failli was legally (e.g. by syndics), symbolically (by the scellés), rhetorically 
(via the loss of reputation), and physically (by coercive arrest, expulsion from the stock 
exchange) excluded from the merchant community. Since the mid of the 19th century, this 
conception of moralization by exclusion was questioned. Not by a purely utilitarian argument: 
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All discussants more or less shared a utilitarian perspective, they simply drew different 
conclusions from the situation. The true novelty was that the legitimacy of the moralizing 
instruments was at stake. The same Napoleonic commercial code, which had reinforced the 
moralizing features of bankruptcy law, also provided, together with other codifications of the 
time, the modernizing judicial and ethical framework that put the individual, his rights and 
freedoms at the center of attention. The evolution of bankruptcy law and of the moralizing 
discourse can be understood can be understood as a double transition from the close ties of 
early modern trade to a new moralism in the late 18th and early 19th century and, again, from 
the Napoleonic era to industrial capitalism. The reinforced moralization of bankrupts in the 
first half of the 19th century was a paradox feature of modernization. 
During the Second Empire and the Third Republic, the debate about the 1807 commercial 
code, the shopkeepers’ act (code des boutiquiers), as it often was disparaged, continued. 
Repeated petitions requested the reform of bankruptcy law and the abolition of the contrainte 
par corps. Only the style of petitions occasionally changed. Whereas the tone vis-à-vis the 
1848 citoyens représentants du peuple was demanding, some years later, the style was 
deferential again, when merchants from 50 French cities pleaded for a reform. The petitioners 
simply cloaked the Republican style of their original address in an imperial overcoat: The 
signature lists, collected earlier, were bound into green leather, embossed with Napoléon III’s 
gilded imperial monogram and with bees, a heraldic symbol of both Napoleonic Empires.61 
Hedging the Ubiquity of Debt 
The German economist Lorenz von Stein (1815–90) was a fine connoisseur of French 
political ideologies of the 19th century in general and of French socialist thinkers like the 
above cited Charles Fourier. He believed that ‘Fallissemente’ were a symptom of the social 
and economic development of a society. Speculation, the degree of entanglement by credit-
debt relations and the capitalist orientation towards future profits would provoke more cases 
of bankruptcy. The growing demand for capital would make companies take considerable risk 
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in order to be competitive. Von Stein deplored the deficits of moral and legal institutions, 
which were needed to frame the growing dependency on capital.62 
In fact, these social institutions were highly-contested in 19th century France, especially the 
pre-modern features of the Code de commerce, and they provoked highly moralized 
questions: Were you a failli or a banqueroutier? Did you act negligently or in bad faith? Were 
your transactions risky, but regular? Was it bad luck or an unexpected economic downturn? 
Would you stay in prison, or did you merit a provisional release? Did you qualify for 
rehabilitation? Was it your fault, or was it fate? 
The asynchrony of the traditional features of bankruptcy law in an epoch of liberal and 
individualist legislation, was fueled by the tension between the individual and social 
dimensions of bankruptcy, between individual and public realm. Even today, the basic lines of 
this conflict are still present in public debate. Some European commentators, for instance, 
responded with amazement, as the then presidential candidate Donald J. Trump displayed 
satisfaction about the fact, that he never had gone ‘bank bankrupt’. He had successfully used 
the dispositions of the American bankruptcy law, namely the chapter 11 procedures (U.S. 
Code, Title 11, chapter 11), reorganized his companies and liquidated loss-making activities, 
or as he put it: ‘I used the law four times and made a tremendous thing. I’m in business. I did 
a very good job.’63 Apparently, the worst fears of some of the discussants of 1848 came true: 
Insolvency is a business option, even if in Europe public opinion still is reticent about that. 
The example of bankruptcy helps to analyze the construction of economic morality at a 
crucial point of the life of a merchant. Unpaid debt refers to the relational character of both 
debt and morality, as all stakeholders were mutually bound together by means of the due 
money–both before and after filing bankruptcy. Debt, mostly in the form of trade credits, was 
and is omnipresent and essential for capitalism. Trade credits ensure liquidity and constitute 
the major part of the floating capital; they dematerialize transactions; their reproducibility and 
reciprocity stabilize the system of debt and contribute to its expansion. 
Unpaid debt was a moral problem precisely because debt in general was an integral part of the 
economic system. This got evident in a time of economic and political crisis like the 1848 
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Revolution, when creditors ran the risk to become defaulting debtors themselves.64 This 
ambiguity may explain the eagerness to punish those who ‘failed’–in the moral as well as in 
the business sense.65 If this was true, when debating about particular cases the system was 
always at issue. Moralizing bankruptcy meant to build a firewall between the collapsed faillis 
and a legitimate culture of debt. The traditional instruments for building this firewall–
discursive, symbolic and physical exclusion–lost their force during the 19th century. 
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